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ABSTRACT: In recent years, there has been a rise in the popularity of preferential trading
arrangements (PTA), and an equally precipitous rise in the number of papers studying the
effects of regionalism. In this paper we assess the effect of preferential trading arrangements
on the aggregate and bilateral trading patterns of member countries, and test for three
effects of PTAs. Ohe, does the aggregate trade of individual member countries rise with
a PTA? Two, is the bilateral trade of individual member countries biased toward bloc
members? Three, do PTAs as a whole have trade creating or diverting effects? Our
technique is related to a modified gravity equation, a popular tool used in this recent
empirical work. \Ve provide a criticism of this tool, and we adapt the approach to correct
mis-specification problems in its common use.
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I. Introduction: The Regional Literature
In recent years, we have witnessed a rise in the popularity of preferential trading
arrangements (PTA). The European Union is gradually expanding its size, the North
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) is poised to become the Western Hemispheric Free
Trade Area and the possibility of an agreement among the APEC nations is becoming
a reality. Many have criticized this trend, indeed, Frankel and Wei (1995) refer to it as
a "modern Pandora's Box". Others applaud it by suggesting that the rise of PTAs is
evidence that the GATT is dead, should be shot, or perhaps even both. Accordingly, there
has been a precipitous rise in the number of papers studying the effects of regionalism.
The research emphasis of this resurgent literature involves broader concerns than
the studies of PTAs historically. Historically, the debate has centered around member
country welfare, while the. recent debate has focused more broadly on the consequences
of PTAs from a global perspective. Launching the debate was Krugman (1991), followed
closely by Deardorff and Stern (1991) and Haveman (1995), among others. This debate
has been primarily concerned with the long run time-path of world welfare.
Lacking a full complement of PTAs, the world has not yet reached a trade bloc
endgame, so long run effects are unclear. The recent empirical work has taken a more static
view of the i~sue. Efforts have been directed towards discerning the trade creating and
trade diverting effects of existing trade blocs, both formal and informal. Trade creation
and trade diversion are generally thought to encompass the positive and negative aspects
of bloc formation. Therefore, assessing the extent to which the current blocs have resulted
1
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III the one or the other can provide us with an indication of the static global welfare
consequences of the actual pattern of regionalization.
In this paper we assess the effect of preferential trading arrangements on the ag-
gregate and bilateral trading patterns of member countries, and test for three effects of
PTAs. One, does the aggregate trade of individual member countries rise with a PTA? As
demonstrated by Bhagwati (1971), the absence of increased trade volumes for bloc mem-
bers is a sufficient indicator that member welfare will decline; that is, that the bloc results
in only trade diversion and no trade creation. Two, is the bilateral trade of individual
member countries biased toward bloc members? This informs us of the trade creating and
trade diverting effects of PTAs, while recognizing that there is no particular reason to
assume that PTAs affect all members in the same way. It also allows us to examine and
explain differences across members in these effects. Three, do PTAs as a whole have trade
creating or diverting effects? This question has been the primary emphasis of the existing
empirical literature on the effects of PTAs. Our technique is related to a modified gravity
equation, a popular tool used in this recent empirical work. 1
However, we adapt the approach to reflect certain problems detailed below. Under
certain conditions (complete specialization in production), the gravity model is not only
an appropriate test for regional bias, it is exactly the right test. Under more general
conditions (incomplete specialization) the gravity model represents a reduced form of a
larger system of structural equations, and its popular use for measuring the determinants
of bilateral trade flows may pose serious mis-specification problems. The simple form of
the gravity model relates bilateral trade to the size of trading partners and the distance
between them;
VTij = YiYj (1)
Dij
where VTij is- i's total imports from j, Yi i~ i's GDP, and Dij is the distance from i to j.2 It
is often said that gravity models fit the data well, but lack theoretical foundations. Fitting
1 For a representative paper, see Frankel, Stein and Wei, (1994) or Frankel and Wei (1995).






- Dep Var: Imports to I from J
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Income
Group Constant Importer Exporter Distance R2 N
ALL -1.096*** 0.950*** 0.860*** -1.115*** 0.495 9,234
(0.303) (0.013) (0.012) (0.029)
Grouped according to Importer GOP/Pop
4th Quartile -1.455*** 0.945*** 0.859*** -0.990*** 0.561 3,836
(0.465) (0.019) (0.017) (0.041)
3rd Quartile -1.476*** 0.853*** 0.964*** -1.120** 0.480 2,434
(0.620) (0.032) (0.024) (0.055)
2nd Quartile -1.578** 0.719*** 0.891*** -1.253**· 0.409 1,638
(0.667) (0.036) (0.030) (0.070)
1at Quartile
-1.135 0.572*** 0.771*** -0.920··· 0.310 1,326
(0.733) (0.036) (0.035) (0.089)
***, **, * Significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
the data well in this case means that the proposed explanatory variables are significantly
related to bilateral trade, and that "much" of the variance in trade volume is explained.
Because of its fit, the gravity equation provides an attractive baseline against which
to measure the effects of regional trading arrangements. In a typical formulation, equation
(1) is amended to include an array of plausible correlates with trade plus two dummy
variables: region1 indicates only one member of the country pair is a member of the
regional trading bloc, and region2 indicates bloc membership by both partners.3
y;y.
In(VTij) = a + ,81 In(YiYj) + ,82In(;i ~) + ,83In(DISTANCEij) (2)
+ ,84 (adjacent) + ,85(Language) + J(region1) + ,(region2) + Uij
The interpretation is that country characteristics like size and per capita income, and
bilateral characteristics like distance, adjacency and language describe "normal" patterns
of bilateral trade. In the presence of PTAs, however, trade between countries may be
influenced as follows. First, trade creation causes countries within the bloc to have bilateral
3 Table 2 presents representative results.
Table 2
General Gravity Equation
- Dep Var: Imports to I from J
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
-
Income Per-Capita Income Common
Group Constant Importer Exporter Distance Importer Exporter Language Contiguity R2 N
All -15.347 ... 0.824··· 0.802 ... -0.990··· 0.140··· 0.071 ••• 0.521 ••• 0.583··· 0.546 9,234
(0.313) (0.014) (0.013) (0.031) (0.005) (0.005) (0.070) (0.142)
Grouped according to GDP/Pop
4th Quartile -16.344··· 0.913··· 0.792··· -0.895··· 0.082·" 0.072··· 0.573··· 0.391 • 0.588 3,836
(0.472) (0.019) (0.018) (0.044) (0.008) (0.007) (0.109) (0.231)
3rd Quartile -16.257··· 0.876··· 0.880··· -0.999·" 0.002 0.080··· 0.432··· 0.787··· 0.479 2,434
(0.660) (0.033) (0.026) (0.060) (0.036) (0.009) (0.147) (0.277)
2nd Quartile -12.863··· 0.754··· 0.808··· -1.227··· 0.205 • 0.085 ... 0.269 • 0.625 • 0.431 1,638
(0.799) (0.037) (0.032) (0.081) (0.114) (0.012) (0.164) (0.335)
1at Quartile -13.332··· 0.589··· 0.737··· -0.875··· 0.029 0.050··· 0.746··· 0.453 0.326 1,326
(0.871) (0.036) (0.039) (0.103) (0.199) (0.013) (0.176) (0.350)
••• , •• , • Significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10% level respectively.
i~
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trade volumes that exceed the "normal" volume of trade, but does not change the trade
with countries outside the bloc - region2 will be positive, and region1 will be zero. Second,
trade diversion causes abnormally high intra-bloc trade and member countries will trade
less than "normal" with countries outside the bloc - region2 will be positive and region1
will be negative.
There are a number of studies applying this methodology to an analysis of both the
European Community (EC) and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries. The
results are, however, far from definitive.
Studies of the EC vary dramatically in their conclusions. Bikker (1987) finds an
extra-bloc bias for the early years of the union and the absence of any bias for the 1980s.
Bergstrand (1985) finds that the union raised intra-bloc trade between 1965 and 1976.
Aitken (1973) finds a significant inward bias in 1967. Brada and Mendez (1993) also find
a significant inward bias for the EC between 1954 and 1977. Intermediate results include
Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995) and Hamilton and Winters (1992), both of which find no
significant evidence of bias until the mid 1980s.
Results are similarly mixed for the EFTA bloc. Both Frankel, Stein and Wei, and
Hamilton and Winters find that the EFTA bias is seldom significant. Studies that find an
inward bias for the EFTA include Boisso and Ferrantino (1995), who find a moderate affect
between 1966 and 1972, Brada and Mendez, who find significant effects for the period 1954
to 1977, and Aitken who finds a significant inward bias for 1967.
It is troubling that these studies, all using a similar methodology, find such dis-
parate results. Part of this may be due to differences in data selection, as these studies
vary in the countries they include, the explanatory variables they employ, and the years
they examine. However, we claim that this inconsistency is not surprising, and points to
two general problems with the gravity approach.
First, the usefulness of this exercise depends on the relationship of the baseline
estimates of "normal" bilateral trade volumes to theory. Put another way, without knowing
why trade volumes should "normally" depend on equation (1), or its like, it is difficult to
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gauge the importance of deviations from this relationship. The gravity equation can be
derived from models with monopolistic competition or complete specialization, and such
models are frequently invoked to motivate the gravity approach. However, as we show
in previous work (Haveman and Hummels, 1995) and summarize below, equation (1) is
consistent with· a broad category of models. As a result, even if the included bloc dummies
correctly measure regional biases in bilateral trade patterns, the normative implications of
these deviations are left unclear.
The second problem is that regional trading bloc dummies do not necessarily pro-
vide evidence of intra-regional bias. Bloc members may possess characteristics that are
unrelated to their membership in the bloc, yet predict higher or lower trade volumes among
them than among other similar countries. This is a classic case of omitted variables bias,
and we identify a specific source of omission - cross-country differences in aggregate trade
volumes. We demonstrate that this omission will cause systematic errors in the interpreta-
tion of bloc dummies, causing investigators to mistake trade creation for trade diversion.
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995) note the omitted variables problem, suggesting
that high levels of intra-bloc trade may be due, not to the formation of preferential trading
arrangements, but rather to historical relationships between bloc members. They address
the problem of unobserved fixed effects by estimating the gravity equation in first differ-
ences. While this approach is an important step, it neglects the possibility of time-varying
omitted variables. We show that if PTAs are trade creating, they necessarily increase the
aggregate trade volume of member countries, which we argue is a critical source of time
varying omitted variables bias. Controlling for fixed effects alone is insufficient - it is also
necessary to control for aggregate trade volume.
In Se<.:tion II, we elaborate on the above criticisms, and suggest new approaches
intended to get at the underlying questions of trade creation and trade diversion. In
Section III, we apply previously used methods, as well as our innovations to assess the
importance of omitted variables, and provide some evidence on the effects of preferential
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trade arrangements. Section IV summarizes and concludes.
II. A Methodological Critique and Correction of the Gravity Model
Much of the empirical work on regional trade patterns motivates its use of the
gravity equation by appealing to models of monopolistic competition or complete special-
ization. Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1985) demonstrate that the gravity equation is
consistent with these models - if production is completely specialized, equation (1) is an
exact description of how trade is and how trade should be.
Consider a world with n countries and m goods, m > n. The production of
goods is completely specialized so that every country is the sole supplier of the goods that
it produces; the reason for this specialization is unimportant for our current purposes.
Preferences are identical across countries and there is no trade resistance in the form of
tariff barriers or transport costs.
The assumption of identical preferences means that each country j will consume an
amount of every good, X k , equal to that country's share in world income, Sj, cj = SjXk .
With specialization, consumption of each good is equal to the imports of good k from i to
j, or Mi~ = SjXk . Country j will demand a similar fraction of all the goods produced in
country i, so total import demand is given by Mij = Sj L:k Xf. But L:k Xf is just total
output in country i, and hence, MiJo = sJ°1l;. Finally, SJO = Y.l'J ,so this gives us the total
world
imports from i to j as Mij = y'l'il'J . This relationship will hold exactly for every pair of
world
countries. When estimating this equation in cross-section, world income is a constant; this
gives us the basic proportionality between trade and incomes captured in equation (1).
Incorporating the effects of differential tariff rates complicates this simple model.
However, it i~ possible to show that in a model with monopolistic competition, regional
trade biases correspond precisely to deviations from the basic equation. That is, using
regional dummies as in equation (2) exactly captures trade creation and trade diversion.
Consider three cases. In the first, the importer has zero external tariffs. In the second, the
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importer has a uniform external tariff. In the third, the importer forms a customs union
with one or more partners so that some countries face a zero tariff, and other countries
face an external tariff. We demonstrate in an appendix that these cases can be represented
by modifying the simple gravity model as follows.
With no external tariff, bilateral trade volume IS given by the simple equation,
Mij = YiYj. With a uniform external tariff, bilateral trade volumes are given by Mij =
aYiYj. With a preferential trade arrangement, bilateral trade between members of the bloc
will be given by Mij = bYiYj, and bilateral trade between bloc and non-bloc members will
be given by Mij = cYiIj. The relative values of these coefficients are b > a > c. In other
words, consider the case of uniform tariffs as "normal". Then, the coefficient a gives the
intercept term in a gravity regression. b > a indicates the presence of trade creation, and
c < a indicates trade diversion.
The proportionality between trade and incomes expressed above is an exact struc-
tural specification, not a reduced form relationship. It should hold for every country pair,
and deviations from it are welfare decreasing. Then, if production is completely speciai-
ized, the gravity approach to measure regional trade biases is not only appropriate, it is
exactly right.
However, there are strong a priori reasons to believe that production is not com-
pletely specialized, for example, a large number of countries produce and export wheat.
Consider the problem of a small country choosing to import wheat from among ten equally
sized exporter countries, each of which charges the same c.i.f. price for its wheat. The
gravity equation predicts that this country will import one-tenth of the total amount from
each country, but this country could buy from any of the ten in an essentially random
pattern so that the actual bilateral pattern is indeterminate. 4
4 Savage and Deutsch (1960) and Deardorff (1995) present models suggesting that, in such situations, the actual
trading pattern might look like equation (1) if exporters sell to, and importers buy from, a world pool of wheat.
The idea is that, with random draws from a world pool, the chance of a given bilateral pair matching will be a
function of the size of their draws (i.e. their economic size). It should be noted, however, that while the pattern
could look like this, it need not. Further, the normative implications of this pattern are far different than in
complete specialization models. That is, countries might tend to spread purchases in the way suggested by the
'gravity equation, but deviations from it are not welfare reducing.
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Table 3
- Dep Var: Volume of Imports
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Per-Capita
Group Constant Income Income R2 N
ALL -1.286··· 0.829··· 0.695··· .851 123
(0.438) (0.047) (0.087)
Grouped according to GDP/Pop
4th Quartile . 1.425 0.600··· 0.774··· .781 30
(1.321) (0.108) (0.118)
3rd Quartile 1.568 0.511 ••• 1.042··· .765 29
(2.156) (0.200) (0.119)
2nd Quartile 5.117·· 0.146 0.398·· .165 31
(2.272) (0.250) (0.175)
1at Quartile -4.136·· 1.200··· 0.615··· .539 33
(1.843) (0.243) (0.220)
•••, •• , • Significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10% level respectively.
The potential for indeterminate bilateral trade is present whenever more than one
country produces the same good, which raises the question: why does the gravity model fit
so well? We answer this in previous work (Haveman and Hummels, 1995) by demonstrating
two points. First, the gravity equation relates the bilateral trade volume between countries
i and j to a set of country characteristics for countries i and j (like GDP and per capita
GDP for each), and country pair characteristics (distance, adjacency, common language,
and so forth), VTij = f (Xi, X j , Xij). We examine a model with homogeneous goods
(and therefore, bilaterally indeterminate trade) that explains the multilateral volume of
trade under very general circumstances. We show that multilateral trade volume will
depend on economic size and (given some special assumptions) per capita income. In other
words, the country characteristics for country i included in a bilateral gravity equation
are also determinants of i's multilateral trade volume in models where bilateral trade is
indeterminate.5
Second, because of an adding up constraint, any variable that affects a country's
multilateral trade volume must, on average, affect its trade volume with its bilateral pairs.
5 See Table 3 for representative results of these multilateral trade regressions.
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To see this, Figure 1 displays fitted lines for two regressions, a regression of multilateral
trade volume on country size (GDP), and a regression of bilateral trade volumes on country
size. The regression lines run through the point of means, and multilateral and bilateral
means must be related due to an adding up constraint.6 This implies that any variable
"
that affects multilateral trade volume will necessarily appear to matter for bilateral trade







This presents us with the following quandary. Are bilateral flows determined as a
function of the variables in equation (2), as would be suggested by a model of complete
specialization? Or, are multilateral trade flows determined, as in a model with incomplete
specialization, and then divided randomly among bilateral pairs? Consider a positive
shock to couI;ltry j's income. A complete specialization model implies that this shock will
increase all bilateral volumes VTij (all partners i will export to and import from j more
6 This is only strictly correct if the gravity equation is estimated in levels. llhere are some complications to
this analysis posed by using a log-log functional form, the typical formulation used in gravity estimates. See
Haveman and Hummels (1995) for details.
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than previously), and, incidentally, affect multilateral trade volume because of adding
up. However, in a model with incomplete specialization, this positive shock will increase
country j's multilateral trade, and will be distributed rand'omly through the bilateral
pairs. That is, when j grows, its import demand for wheat grows, but the way in which
this increased demand is spread over multiple exporters is unclear. Averaging over all
partners i, bilateral trade will increase, but some may increase more than others, or not
at all.
In the first case, VTij = J(Yi, ft, Y'j, iJ;, Xij], and, trivially, VTi = S· VTij. In the
second case, the gravity equation is simply a reduced form of a larger system of structural
equations. VTij = f{VTi, VTj, Xij) = f[g{}'i, -k), h{Yj, iJ;), Xij]. At this point, we do not
know which model is correct, or if one is more or less appropriate in certain circumstances.
But if the second model is right there are several important implications.
First, the fit of the gravity equation does not represent evidence in favor of models
with deterministic bilateral trade flows. Therefore, deviations from an average relationship
between bilateral trade volume and country size are not in any sense "abnormal". Rather,
they may simply represent the randomness inherent in a choice between a number of equal
cost exporters.
In this context, consider the interpretation of the regional dummy variables from
equation (2). Assume a world with many importers and many exporters of wheat, all of
whom supply wheat at the same price. One of these importers, country A, has a uniform
tariff on wheat, and buys some wheat from two countries chosen at random, Band C. Now,
A enters into a preferential trading arrangement with B, so that all of A's wheat imports
come from B. As measured by the gravity model approach of equation (2), this appears
as trade diver:sion - intra-bloc trade rises, and extra-bloc trade falls. However, the PTA is
not trade-diverting in the usual sense, A has not given up a cheaper source of supply, and
C is not made worse off by the tariff, because there are many alternative importers to sell
to.
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The second problem with the gravity model approach is that it mis-specifies the
relationship between country characteristics and bilateral trade, creating omitted variables
bias. Consider the possibility that trade is determined vis a vis the world and distributed
in some indeterminate way among its bilateral partners. If a country's multilateral trade
is higher than its size predicts, then its observation lies above the VTj regression line in
Figure 1. In this case, the trade of its bilateral pairs must, on average, lie above the VTij
regression line in Figure 1. A country dummy inserted into this bilateral 'regression will
certainly be positive, and pairs involving this country will tend to lie above the regression
line. For a given bilateral pair, if both countries have an above average tendency to trade
overall, this tendency is reinforced. This is not to say that everyone of the bilateral pairs
will be above average, merely that there will be a tendency in this direction.
Now consider the intra-bloc (region2) and extra-bloc (region1) dummies from equa-
tion (2), and assume that members of PTAs have a greater tendency to trade, in the ag-
gregate, than the rest of the world. Then, intra-bloc dummies will tend to be positive and
extra-bloc dummies will tend to be smaller, perhaps negative, the sign pattern usually in-
terpreted as evidence of trade diversion. Why would PTA members tend to trade more in
the aggregate? One obvious reason is that the bloc is trade creating. If the bloc trades less
in the aggregate than the rest of the world (perhaps because it is strongly trade diverting),
the sign pattern will be just the opposite. This would be interpreted as evidence against
trade diversion.
Our hypothesis is that the coefficients on the intra-bloc and extra-bloc dummies can
yield a sign pattern that will fool the investigator into finding diversion when none exists
and dismissing the possibility when it does exist. In order to illustrate this hypothesis, we
begin with a .complete bilateral matrix of all world trade flows in 1980. We randomly form
"trading blocs" , groups of ten countries whose only common element is a similar propensity
to trade in the aggregate. We then run standard bilateral gravity regressions that include
intra-bloc and extra-bloc dummies. By grouping countries with no common membership
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in regional or customs union blocs, we eliminate the possibility that the bloc intercepts
measure actual trade creation or diversion caused by preferential trade arrangements.
Our first exercise is to randomly select ten countries from the set of 25 countries
engaging in relatively MORE trade; where trade is measured as multilateral imports plus
exports. If our suggested interpretation of the dummy variable coefficients is correct,
then we should see a positive intra-bloc effect and a smaller, perhaps negative, extra-bloc
coefficient. This is because the multilateral trade of member countries is greater than for
the average country outside of the bloc, imparting a positive bias on the intra-bloc dummy.
Similarly, the multilateral trade of non-bloc countries is less than the bloc countries, so
the extra-bloc dummy will likely be less than the coefficient on the intra-bloc dummy. If
the multilateral trade of non-bloc countries is less than the world average, the extra-bloc
dummy will tend to be negative.
Our second exercise is to select ten countries from the set of 25 countries engaging
in relatively LESS trade. Our expectation here is simply the reverse of the above. Because
these countries all trade less than the world average, the coefficient on the intra-bloc
dummy will be negative. As the non-member countries generally trade more than the
world average, the coefficient on the extra-bloc dummy will be larger, perhaps positive.
Table 4 presents the results of these two exercises. We present the average intra-
bloc and extra-bloc coefficients from 250 simulations; that is, from regressions analyzing
250 different random blocs. The results presented in the top half of the table are from a
traditional specification of the gravity model; right hand side variables include importer
and exporter incomes; importer and exporter income per-capita, distance, contiguity and
whether or not they speak a common language. The results in the bottom half are con-
ceptually identical to those in the bottom with the exception that importer and exporter
income on the right hand side of the gravity equation are replaced by multilateral trade
volumes, VTi.
Turning first to the top of Table 4, column 1 presents the results from the simula-
i4
Table 4
Simulating the Formation of Blocs
- Dependent Variable: Total Trade Between I and J
(1) (2) (3)
Big 1Xader Blocs
Intra-Bloc .820 .564 .575
Extra-Bloc .549 .487 .489
Small1Xader Blocs
Intra-Bloc -1.846 -1.498 -.859




















"Intra-Bloc" is a dummy variable for both countries
being members of the simulated trading bloc.
"Extra-Bloc" is a dummy variable for only one country
being a member of the simulated trading bloc.
tions outlined above; that is, where countries are ranked according to their absolute level
of trade. The average coefficients are consistent with our expectations. An examination
of these blocs in a standard gravity framework would erroneously conclude that we have a
positive intra-regional bias when we create "big trader blocs" and a negative intra-regional
bias when we create "small trader blocs" even though the countries included in these blocs
do not belong to a common preferential trading arrangement.
As commonly used, this pair of dummy variables may be a reflection of actual
regional bias1 trade creation or diversion. We contend, however, that unless the size of
multilateral trade is adequately accounted for, the sign pattern on the region dummies
may be misleading. This point is illustrated in the bottom of column 1 where we find no
systematic bias inward or outward; in other words, controlling for aggregate trade volume
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on the right hand side of the equation eliminates the reported bias in our random trade
blocs.
What remains in question is to what extent the particular ranking is driving our
results. In columns 2 and 3, we repeat the exercise with alternative rankings of countries.
Column 2 results from ranking countries by they extent to which they trade more than is
explained by their income alone. That is, we generate a ranking by regressing multilateral
trade on size (GDP) and individual country dummies - the regression is a panel spanning
the years 1980 to 1992. The resulting coefficients on the dummy variables are then used to
generate the rankings. Column 3 is generated in the same manner, except that per-capita
income is included in the multilateral trade regression. Much to our surprise, accounting
for the primary determinants of trade flows does not eliminate the pattern. Although
the pattern does not disappear, it does become weaker as we control for more of the
determinants of multilateral trade.
There are two important implications here. First, the level of multilateral trade is a
critical determinant of bilateral trade. To the extent that variables like size and per capita
income incompletely measure multilateral trade, estimates of bilateral trade volumes will
be subject to omitted variables bias. As seen in Table 3, these variables explain somewhere
between 16 and 85% of multilateral trade. Further, the coefficient values are not stable
over the sample countries. Constraining the relationship to be the same across all countries
(~ in a standard gravity model) mis-predicts the effect of these variables on multilateral,
and hence, bilateral trade. This provides a reasonable explanation for why existing gravity
studies are so inconsistent in their findings of regional bias. Varying the sample of countries
gives the researcher a different baseline of "normal" multilateral trade volumes so that the
resulting dummy variables will necessarily pick up different residual effects.
Second, while this exercise emphasizes the importance of omitting multilateral
trade volumes, the criticism is applicable to any determinants of trade that are traditionally
left out of a gravity model. More generally, when blocs are formed in a systematic way,
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and there are omitted variables that are related to bloc formation, the standard analysis
is susceptible to both false negative and false positive indicators of regional bias.
11.1 Corrections to the Gravity Model
In Haveman and Hummels (1995), we have argued that the gravity equation as
traditionally estimated is merely a reduced form of a larger system of structural equations;
a system including the specification of a country's multilateral volume of trade. The
proper econometric correction depends on whether we think multilateral trade volume is
endogenous or exogenous. The possibility for endogeneity exists because of adding up - a
shock to a particular bilateral trade volume, VTij, may increase multilateral trade VTi or
If the multilateral volume of trade is exogenous, then the multilateral volume is
determined by certain country characteristics and bilateral flows are determined subse-
quently. Positive shocks to the bilateral trade volume of a particular pair do not affect
multilateral volumes, as they are simply offset by decreases to other pairs. If multilateral
trade is an exogenous determinant of bilateral flows, and if country characteristics only
provide information about multilateral trade, multilateral trade should simply be included
in the bilateral regression in lieu of the country characteristics.
(3)
+ /h(adjacent) + f3s(Language) + J(region1) + ,(region2) + Uij
This specification eliminates problems arising from the omission of economic variables
primarily associated with the determination of multilateral trade volumes. In other words,
if included country characteristics incompletely explain multilateral trade, the traditional
estimation creates omitted variables bias that we correct by including multilateral trade
directly.7
7 An alternative that is appropriate for cross-sectional estimates would be to simply include importer and exporter
dummy variables in the bilateral regression.
17 May 1996
As Bayoumi and Eichengreen suggest, the estimation of equation (2) also suffers
from omitted country-pair effects. That is, high levels of intra-bloc trade may be due, not
to the formation of preferential trading arrangements, but rather to historical or political
relationships between bloc members. For example, Frankel and Wei (1995) find an intra-
NAFTA trade bias in 1980, well before the signing of that accord. Estimating equation
(2) in first difference form eliminates these time invariant influences that are specific to
country pairs. If the multilateral trade effects we describe above are time invariant, then
the first-difference estimates solve the problem. However, multilateral trade effects will
vary over time in precisely the case we want to test for: if the formation of preferential
trading arrangements causes trade creation or trade diversion.8
However, we think it unlikely that multilateral trade volumes are truly exogenous,
that is, most trade shocks are likely to change both the multilateral volume of trade and
the distribution over pairs. Consider the formation of a preferential trade arrangement.
Differential tariff rates change the relative prices of imports from different sources, thereby
changing the bilateral distribution through trade creation and/or diversion. The volume
of multilateral trade will also be affected except in the very specific case where these two
effects exactly cancel each other out, where increased trade within the bloc is exactly offset
by decreased trade with partners outside the bloc. Although specific examples of this can
be constructed, they require strong, and unlikely assumptions.
If the multilateral volume of trade is endogenously determined, it would be inap-
propriate to simply insert it into the bilateral equation. Alternatively, one could perform
an instrumental variables estimation properly instrumenting for the multilateral volume of
trade. The conventional method (including country characteristics directly in a regression
on bilateral trade) is not unrelated to an instrumental variables approach, but is statis-
tically incorrect. Unfortunately, valid instruments are difficult to come by for the reason
just given - most trade shocks will affect both bilateral and multilateral volumes.
8 We will incorporate tests of this sort in future versions of the paper.
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A simpler approach that we pursue here involves estimating bilateral trade shares
for one importer at a time. We focus only on import volumes of bloc members; the trade
bloc dummy (regionl) indicates that the trading partner is also a member of the bloc.
VTI· Y·
in( V;:) = Q + fhln(Yj) + /32 In(~) + /33 In(DISTANCE ij) (4)
+ /34 (adjacent) + /35 (Language) + o(regionl) + ,(region2) + Uij
This specification solves the problem of multilateral trade as an omitted variable, but its
use is limited. Since we are explaining the bilateral shares of a particular importer, an
unusually high or low multilateral import volume for country i will not bias the region
dummy up or down. Also, since we are examining only one importer at a time, unusually
high or low multilateral export volumes for country j will not matter either. Remember,
the usual problem with gravity estimates is that multilateral effects must show up in the
bilateral regression if one includes all pairs. So, if we estimate equation (4) for all importers,
large multilateral export volumes for a country j has to, on average, bias the intercepts of
its pairs upward. This is not a problem if we examine only one importer country at a time
because the VTj shock mayor may not show up· in VTij.
There is another compelling reason to examine these bilateral shares separately for
each importer. There is no particular reason to assume that trade blocs are uniformly trade
creating or trade diverting over all members. This approach allows us to identify different
effects for each bloc member. However, it is not possible to use this estimation strategy to
answer the broader question: is the trade bloc trade diverting in the multilateral?
III. Results: Do unobservables matter?
Our goal in this section is to illustrate the extent to which unobservable charac-
teristics affect estimates of regional trading bias. We first estimate equation (2) in order
to produce estimates similar in spirit to the results in Frankel and Wei (1995). We also




Regression 1 Regression 2
Year EC EFTA EC2 EC1 EFTA2 EFTA1
Pre-EC and Pre-EFTA
1949 0.600*** 0.132 -0.131 -0.587*** -0.092 0.042
(0.152) (0.173) (0.391) (0.154) (0.536) (0.178)
1954 0.659*** 0.208 0.066 0.640*** -0.091 0.135
(0.141) (0.165) (0.378) (0.143) (0.520) (0.170)
Early-EC and Early-EFTA
1964 0.651*** 0.238 0.200 0.653*** 0.374 0.173
(0.129) (0.152) (0.348) (0.131) (0.477) (0.158)
Post Phase in -EC and -EFTA
1980 0.585*** -0.259*** -0.648* 0.599*** -0.527 -0.281 ***
(0.082) (0.097) (0.379) (0.082) (0.603) (0.098)
1981 0.565*** -0.220** -0.758** 0.580*** -0.581 -0.242***
(0.079) (0.095) (0.368) (0.079) (0.585) (0.095)
1982 0.656*** -0.213** -0.557 0.672*** -0.461 -0.233***
(0.078) (0.094) (0.372) (0.078) (0.594) (0.094)
1983 0.686*** -0.217** -0.392 0.700*** -0.413 -0.236***
(0.075) (0.091) (0.361) (0.075) (0.576) (0.091)
1984 0.718*** -0.179** -0.275 0.731*** -0.308 -0.196**
(0.075) (0.091) (0.363) (0.075) (0.578) (0.091)
1985 0.780*** -0.146* -0.040 0.792*** -0.197 -0.160*
(0.073) (0.089) (0.357) (0.074) (0.570) (0.089)
1986 0.825*** -0.043 0.079 0.835*** 0.009 -0.058
(0.074) (0.089) (0.357) (0.074) (0.570) (0.090)
1987 0.640*** -0.230*** -0.283 0.649*** -0.308 -0.249***
(0.073) (0.088) (0.352) (0.074) (0.560) (0.089)
1988 0.381*** -0.496*** -0.774** 0.389*** -0.793 -0.519***
(0.072) (0.086) (0.343) (0.072) (0.545) (0.087)
1989 0.406*** -0.418*** -0.892*** 0.414*** -0.850 -0.445***
(0.072) (0.086) (0.341) (0.072) (0.541) (0.087)
***, **, * Significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
experiment shown in Table 4. We subsequently perform a series of bilateral trade share
estimates of equation (4).
In Table 5, we present estimates from two regressions. Columns 1 and 2 are from
a regression including dummies that indicate at least one trade partner is a bloc member
(EC and EFTA). In columns 3-6, we present estimates of regressions including dummies
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that indicate that at most one trade partner is a member of a bloc (ECl and EFTAl),
and that both partners are bloc members (EC2 and EFTA2).9
What we find is surprising. First, in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5, the coefficient on
the EC dummy is always positive, while the coefficient on the EFTA dummy is positive in
the years before the agreement is completely in force and always negative thereafter. It is
worth noting that the adding up logic may be at work here. We have also run a multilateral
trade regression similar to those in Table 3 including dummies indicating that the importer
is a member of the EC or EFTA. These dummies are respectively positive and negative in
the multilateral regressions, just as their pairs are in the bilateral regression. This leads
us to suspect that there will be a bias in the subsequent set of dummies akin to that
illustrated in Table 4; that is, the EC is similar to a "big trader bloc" and the EFTA is
similar to a "small trader bloc" .
In total, the EC trades more than one would expect, so if there is no regional bias,
we expect the EC2 dummy to be positive and the ECl dummy to be smaller, perhaps
negative. The estimates in columns 3 and 4 indicate that the EC has apparently established
itself in such a way as to strongly divert trade away from other member countries towards
non-members. The ECl coefficients are significantly positive, and the EC2 coefficients are
generally negative (though not always significantly so). This does not constitute evidence
against the argument we made in the random blocs experiment - rather it indicates that
the extra-regional bias of the EC is so strong as to swamp the positive econometric bias
on EC2 created by having a large amount of multilateral trade.
There are a number of plausible explanations for this finding. First, the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) will serve to expand trade between EC members and less
developed countries - all of whom are outside of the customs union. 10 Second, the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) will tend to, among member countries, expand the production of
9 This is the same estimation as in Table 2, but in the interests of space, we omit the other included variables.
They are quite similar to the results in the top line of Table 2.
10 Hamilton and Winters (1992) and Oguledo and MacPhee (1994) both find strong evidence for the influence of
the Lome Convention.
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goods in which countries do not have a comparative advantage. It will do this throughout
the bloc and will therefore inhibit intra-bloc trade. It further encourages the export of
agricultural goods, thereby potentially facilitating extra-bloc trade. We provide more
evidence on this below.
Table 5, column 2, indicates that EFTA countries trade less than normal in the
aggregate. If there is no regional bias, we expect the EFTA2 dummy to be negative and
the EFTA1 dummy to be larger (less negative, or perhaps positive). This expectation
is partially born out. The EFTA1 coefficients are all significantly negative. The EFTA2
coefficients are more negative, but not significantly different from zero.
In Table 6, we present estimates of equation (4), a regression of bilateral trade
shares. This approach controls for multilateral trade effects, assuming that multilateral
trade is endogenous, and also allows us to examine the trade diverting or creating effects
of the EC and EFTA for specific member countries. "Home bias" is a dummy indicating
that the trading partner is also an EC member, "Diversion from other bloc" indicates that
the trading partner is an EFTA member.
Consider the home bias dummy. Of the eight EC countries included, seven have·
strong intra-EC biases, whereas only France has a bias away from the EC. This suggests
that the strong EC trade bias toward non-member countries is driven entirely by France.
A natural explanation for this seems to be the importance of agriculture in France, and the
trade distorting effects of the CAP. Our approach indicates the importance of considering
individual member countries separately, and perhaps examining the trade creating and
diverting effects of blocs on specific commodities.
The bilateral trade shares regressions for the EFTA countries pose something of a
puzzle. All fiye EFTA members exhibit strong intra-EFTA bias in their trade. However,
the EFTA dummies from the regressions in Tables 5 and 6 indicated that this bloc either
had no intra-EFTA bias, or that it was small and negative. How every individual country


































***, **, * Significantly different from zero at the
1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
The complete regression controls for exporter GDP,
per-capita GDP for both the importer and exporter,
aistance, contiguity, and a common language.
nice illustration of the fundamental flaw with the multi-country approach typically used.
The estimates in Tables 5 and 6 require some notion of what constitutes "normal" patterns
of bilateral trade. The underlying country and country pair characteristics provide this
baseline and the regional dummies purport to measure deviations from it. However, there
are a host of importer specific effects that are difficult to control - the estimates in Table




The use of gravity equations to test for the effects of regional bias, while popular,
is seriously flawed. Because the gravity model is estimated as a deterministic structural
model, rather than a reduced form relationship, it is subject to omitted variable bias
of a particular kind. Multilateral trade volumes affect bilateral volumes, and can bias
regional dummies to yield a sign pattern that fools investigators into thinking there is
trade diversion when none exists, and dismissing it when it does.
We examine the trade creating and trade diverting effects of the EC and EFTA
using the standard methodology and reinterpret the effects in light of this bias. We also
introduce an innovation that relies on the use of bilateral trade shares to control for omitted
variable problems with the standard regression, and to examine the effects of blocs on
specific member countries. We find that the EC has a very large extra-EC bias in the
aggregate. However, this is almost entirely because of France; all the other EC countries
have a strong intra-EC bias. We surmise that this pattern is due to the trade distorting
(and extra-EC trade promoting) effects of the Common Agricultural Policy. We find that,
in a standard bilateral regression, the EFTA countries have only a small extra-EFTA
bias. However, when we look at the EFTA countries one by one, we find that all have
a substantial intra-EFTA bias in their trade. This constitutes further evidence of the
difficulty of interpreting regional bias estimates in the context of the gravity model.
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APPENDIX A
Data
The data employed in this study are from a wide variety of sources. The bilateral
trade data for 1949, 1954, and 1964 were generously supplied by pouglas Irwin and Barry
Eichengreen. The bilateral trade data for 1980-1992 are from Statistics Canada's World
Trade Database. The distance measure is constructed as the great circle distance between
economic centers. Countries included in the EC are: Germany, the United Kingdom,
France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium-Luxemburg, Denmark and Ireland. Countries included
in EFTA are: Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Norway and Finland. The data on GDP and
population are from the World Bank CD and are augmented by data from the Penn World
Tables v 5.6 where necessary. The contiguity and language variables were constructed by
the authors.
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